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TAKING A STEP BACK: THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT'S RULING IN OVERTON V.
BAZZETTA 1
I. INTRODUCTION
Stacy Barker, a prisoner of the Michigan Department of
Corrections (MDOC), lost all rights to receive visits from her 11-
year old daughter when she was caught committing her second drug
violation: possession of "a single Motrin pill and an expired
prescription." 2 A federal judge eventually reinstated Barker's right
to receive visits from her daughter,3 but the United States Supreme
Court upheld the underlying regulation that punished Barker in the
first place. In Overton v. Bazzetta,4 the Court held prison officials
possess the power to adopt regulations severely constraining inmate
visitation rights. The Court reasoned such restrictions were
necessary to maintain order in overcrowded prisons;5 this decision,
however, will only exacerbate the problem.
Studies show visits by family and friends reduce the recidivism
rates of prisoners and also encourage them to become better citizens
once they are freed from jail.6 Visitation rights may therefore
1. 539 U.S. 126 (2003).
2. David Shepardson, Prison Visitation Rules Criticized; Rehabilitation
Suffers Under State's Security Concerns, Critics Say, DETROIT NEWS,
June 17, 2001, at 1C; see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, NOWHERE
TO HIDE: RETALIATION AGAINST WOMEN INCARCERATED IN MICHIGAN STATE
PRISONS (1998), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports98/women/Mich-
04.htm#P27963986 (last visited Apr. 10, 2004) (providing evidence that Ms.
Barker was "set up" by prison officers in retaliation for her involvement in
successful litigation against the Michigan Department of Corrections).
3. L.L. Brasier, Prison Hero Gets a New Day in Court, DETROIT FREE
PRESS, available at http://www.freep.com/news/locoak/stacy9__20010809.htm
(Aug. 9, 2001).
4. 539 U.S. 126 (2003).
5. Id. at 129.
6. MODEL SENTENCING AND CORR. ACT § 4-115 cmt., 10 U.L.AI 470
(2001).
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ultimately decrease the prison population because regular visitation
7reduces recidivism rates. Also, while prisons may have a
penological interest in restricting prisoners' visitation rights, such an
interest should not undermine one of the very reasons for prisons:
rehabilitation.
8
This Case Comment begins in Part II by briefly outlining the
history of prisoners' rights and rehabilitation as an acceptable theory
of punishment for prisoners. Part III summarizes the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Overton and its rationale. Part IV
analyzes the Court's decision and argues the Court erred in applying
the four factors of the Turner v. Safley9 test, which determines
whether a regulation withstands a constitutional challenge. Finally,
Part V concludes the decision in Overton does not further the goal of
maintaining order in overcrowded prisons since the lack of visitation
may increase recidivism rates, thereby preserving or increasing
present prison populations and exacerbating overcrowding.
II. BACKGROUND
.A. The 1960s Expansion of Prisoners 'Rights and Rehabilitation as
an Acceptable Theory of Punishment
Prior to the 1960s, courts applied the "hands off' doctrine to
prisoners' rights.' 0 Using this approach, courts abstained from even
recognizing issues regarding prisoners' rights." Starting in the late
1960s, however, and continuing through the 1970s, courts no longer
7. See Suzanne Carol Schuelke, Prisons and Corrections: Prison
Visitation and Family Values, 77 MICH. B.J. 160, 160 (1998) ("Research on
the subject [of visitation rights] overwhelmingly shows that visits have a
positive correlation with the chance of parole success.").
8. "The literature devoted to theories of punishment identifies four
primary justifications for punishment: incapacitation, deterrence, rehabilitation,
and retribution." Mary Sigler, Contradiction, Coherence, and Guided
Discretion in the Supreme Court's Capital Sentencing Jurisprudence, 40 AM.
C~iM. L. REv. 1151, 1154 (2003).
9. 482 U.S. 78, 89-90 (1987).
10. Owen J. Rarric, Comment, Kirsch v. Wisconsin Department of
Corrections: Will the Supreme Court Say "Hands Off' Again?, 35 AKRON L.
REv. 305, 306 (2002).
11. Adam M. Breault, Note, "Onan's Transgression": The Continuing




adhered to this traditional deferential approach and directed prisons
to improve their conditions. 12  It was during this period that
rehabilitation as a theory of punishment dominated American penal
practices.
13
The theory of rehabilitation seeks to encourage the criminal to
conform to the law and reduce the likelihood of recidivism.
4
Imprisonment could therefore be used to improve inmates, providing
them with the chance to gain market skills or treatment for
psychological or substance abuse problems. 15 Once an inmate
returns to society, rehabilitation allows the former inmate to
reintegrate into the community and abide by the laws.16
Rehabilitation helped fuel the courts' prisoners' rights
jurisprudence. ' 7 For example, in Procunier v. Martinez," the United
States Supreme Court found a prison regulation allowing censorship
of inmate mail unconstitutional' 9 while recognizing a legitimate
government interest in rehabilitation. 20 In fact, as late as 1975 the
Colorado Supreme Court declared, "Rehabilitation is the best method
for preventing crime.' 21  Proponents of rehabilitation urged that
reintegrating the offender into the community reduced recidivism
and should be the primary objective of prisons.22 In other words,
rehabilitation was considered best for the criminal and society
12. Lisa Gizzi, Note, Helling v. McKinney and Smoking in the Cell Block:
Cruel and Unusual Punishment?, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 1091, 1097-98 (1994)
(citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974)).
13. Sigler, supra note 8, at 1161; see also RICHARD G. SINGER & JOHN Q.
LA FOND, CRIMINAL LAW: EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS 23 (2d ed. 2001).
14. Michele Cotton, Back with a Vengeance: The Resilience of Retribution
as an Articulated Purpose of Criminal Punishment, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
1313 1316 (2000).
15. Id. at 1316-17.
16. Ashley Paige Dugger, Note, Victim Impact Evidence in Capital
Sentencing: A History of Incompatibility, 23 AM. J. CRIM. L. 375, 402 (1996).
17. See, e.g., Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563 (recognizing the "rehabilitative goals"
of prisons); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 823 (1974) (recognizing that a
"paramount objective of the corrections systems is the rehabilitation of those
committed to its custody."); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974).
18. 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
19. Id. at 417-19.
20. Id. at 413.
21. People v. Duran, 533 P.2d 1116, 1119 (Colo. 1975).
22. WAYNE N. WELSH, COUNTIES IN COURT: JAIL OVERCROWDING AND
COURT-ORDERED REFORM 27 (1995).
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because people believed it effectively reduced the probability of
criminals committing crimes again.
B. Disenchantment with Rehabilitation and the Narrowing of
Prisoners' Rights
By the late 1970s, the public's acceptance of rehabilitation as a
23basis for punishment began to wane. Evidence surfaced showing
rehabilitation had little effect on recidivism, causing the public to
doubt the effectiveness of rehabilitation.24 Criminal jurisprudence,
therefore, shifted to theories of deterrence and retribution because
rehabilitation was no longer seen as a viable goal for American
25prisons. Society believed that "nothing work[ed]" to prevent the
criminal from committing future crimes and therefore rehabilitation
no longer dominated as an acceptable theory of punishment.
26
The United States Supreme Court's halt to the expansion of
prisoners' rights reflected this shift in attitude.27 By 1989, the Court
ruled that during incarceration, inmates have no constitutional right
to unfettered visitation 28 and by 1996, in response to the
overwhelming swell of prison populations, Congress enacted the
Prison Litigation Reform Act29 with the purpose of reducing prisoner
litigation.30 The Prison Litigation Reform Act severely restricted the
ability of prisoners to file civil actions and restricted the courts in
23. Id. at 28. This evidence regarding the ineffectiveness of rehabilitation
was later withdrawn by its author, Robert Martinson. SANFORD H. KADISH &
STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND
MATERIALS 127 (7th ed. 2001). "Nonetheless, the conclusion that 'nothing
works' had become fixed in the public mind, and it has proved difficult to
dislodge." Id.
24. WELSH, supra note 22, at 28-29.
25. Consuelo Alden Vasquez, Note, Prometheus Rebound by the Devolving
Standards Of Decency: The Resurrection of the Chain Gang, 11 ST. JOHN'S J.
LEGAL COMMENT. 221, 237 (1995).
26. See SINGER & LA FOND, supra note 13, at 24; see also KADISH &
SCHULHOFER, supra note 23, at 127-28.
27. See WELSH, supra note 22, at 26.
28. Ky. Dep't of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989).
29. Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§ 801-810, 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-66 (1996)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C. tits. 11, 18, 28, and 42).
30. Ann H. Mathews, Note, The Inapplicability of the Prison Litigation




granting relief in lawsuits brought by prisoners.3' It was in this
climate that the United States Supreme Court decided Overton v.
Bazzetta.
32
II. OVERTON V. BAZETTA
A. The Facts
In 1995, the MDOC enacted regulations limiting the visitation
rights of inmates in response to an increase in Michigan's prison
population during the early 1990s. 33  The MDOC discovered "it
[was] more difficult to maintain order during visitation and to
prevent smuggling or trafficking in drugs" 34 and was concerned with
the increase in visits by children, who risked observing "harmful
conduct" during their visits with prisoners.35
The MDOC regulations:
(1) prohibited visits by an inmate's siblings, nieces and
nephews;
(2) prohibited visits by an inmate's child if parental rights
were terminated;
(3) prohibited visits by former inmates, not including
immediate family;
(4) required a parent or legal guardian to accompany all
visiting children; and
(5) permanently prohibited visitors, except lawyers and
clergy, for an inmate with two substance abuse violations
within the prison.
36
Those prisoners with two substance abuse violations, and thus
subject to the fifth restriction, could "apply for reinstatement of
visitation privileges after two years. Reinstatement [was] within the
warden's discretion."
37
31. Thomas Julian Butler, Comment, The Prison Litigation Reform Act: A
Separation of Powers Dilemma, 50 ALA. L. REv. 585, 589 (1999).
32. 539 U.S. 126 (2003).
33. Id. at 129.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Bazzetta v. McGinnis, 286 F.3d 311, 315 (6th Cir. 2002).
37. Overton, 539 U.S. at 130 (citation omitted).
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Inmates, their friends, and families brought suit against the
MDOC, asserting the regulations, as applied to non-contact visits,
38
violated their First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights.39 The
district court, following a bench trial, held the visitation limitations,
as applied to non-contact visits, violated the inmates' First
Amendment right of intimate association and were not rationally
related to a legitimate penological interest.40  The district court
further held that the prohibition against visitation rights for those
inmates with two substance abuse violations constituted cruel and
unusual punishment, violating the Eighth Amendment and the
inmates' due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.
41
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the judgment, stating the
MDOC did not provide any "convincing justification" for the
regulations.42 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari
and reversed the lower courts.
43
B. The Reasoning of the United States Supreme Court
In a relatively brief opinion by Justice Kennedy, the United
States Supreme Court declared the MDOC's restrictive regulations
on prisoner visitation rights constitutional. Conferring "substantial
deference" to the prison officials' professional judgment,44 the Court
first applied the four-factor balancing test it set forth in Turner v.
Safley,45 which is used to determine whether prison regulations are
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Bazzetta, 286 F.3d at 316. The Eastern District Court of Michigan
"issued two previous decisions, affirmed by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals,
upholding the restrictions in the context of contact visits. Thus, the only
remaining issue ... [was] whether the restrictions [were] constitutional in the
context of non-contact visits." Bazzetta v. McGinnis, 148 F. Supp. 2d 813,
815 (E.D. Mich. 2001). The United States Supreme Court therefore granted
certiorari regarding only non-contact visits. Overton, 539 U.S. at 130.
41. Bazzetta, 286 F.3d at 316.
42. Id. at 323.
43. Overton, 539 U.S. at 131, 137.
44. Id. at 132.
45. 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
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reasonable and withstand a constitutional challenge.46 The factors
are as follows:
(1) A "valid, rational connection" must exist between the
regulation and the legitimate government interest put
forward to justify it;
47
(2) consideration of whether "alternative means" of
exercising the asserted constitutional right remain open to
prisoners;
48
(3) consideration of the impact that accommodating the
asserted right will have on "guards and other inmates, and
on the allocation of prison resources generally; 'A9 and
(4) consideration of "the absence of ready alternatives" to
the regulation.
50
The Court held the restriction on visitation by children bore a
"valid, rational connection" to the legitimate governmental interest
"in maintaining internal security and protecting child visitors from
exposure to sexual or other misconduct or from accidental injury.",
5 1
The Court further held that the restriction on visitation for inmates
with two substance abuse violations bore a "valid, rational
connection" to "deterring the use of drugs and alcohol within the
prisons" and was a "necessary management technique" to encourage
inmate compliance with prison rules.
52
Having determined the MDOC's regulations bore a valid,
rational connection to a legitimate government interest, the Court
then found the inmates possessed "alternative means" of exercising
their rights, since they could communicate through letter-writing and
telephone calls.53 The Court stressed that "[a]lternatives to visitation
need not be ideal, however; they need only be available. 5 4 Thus, the
regulation met the second prong of the Turner test.
46. Overton, 539 U.S. at 132. Courts use the four-factor Turner test to
determine whether a prison regulation is valid when that regulation also
restricts an inmate's constitutional right. Id.
47. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89.
48. Id. at 90.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 89-90.
51. Overton, 539 U.S. at 133.
52. Id. at 134.
53. Id. at 135.
54. Id.
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The Court next examined the impact of accommodating the
prisoners' rights on guards, other inmates, and the allocation of
prison resources. The Court found that accommodating the inmates'
requests would have a great impact on the financial resources of
prisons and would limit the prison employees' ability to protect the
inmates.5  The Court then noted it would give deference to the
MDOC's regulatory judgments in these two areas under the third
prong.
56
Finally, in analyzing the last prong of the Turner test, the
consideration of the lack of ready alternatives, 7 the Court found that
"Turner does not impose a least-restrictive-alternative test,"58 but
instead inquires as to whether the inmate has identified an obvious
alternative that "fully accommodates" the right while not placing
more than a "de minimis" cost on the legitimate governmental
interest.59 The Court then found the inmates failed to suggest any
ready alternatives that would impose less than a de minimis cost on
the prison's interest in maintaining security and decreasing drug
abuse, finding that none of the inmates' suggested alternatives met
the high standards set forth in Turner.
60
After determining the Turner factors were satisfied, the Court
then held the visitation restriction on prisoners with two or more
substance abuse violations did not constitute cruel and unusual
punishment under the Eighth Amendment. 61 The Court asserted this
regulation was an acceptable condition of imprisonment 62 and "[did
not] create inhumane prison conditions, deprive inmates of basic
necessities or fail to protect their health or safety. Nor [did] it
involve the infliction of pain or injury, or deliberate indifference to
the risk that it might occur." 63 The United States Supreme Court
therefore found the MDOC regulations constitutional and severely
restricted inmate visitation rights.
55. Id.
56. Id. (citing Turner, 482 U.S. at 90).
57. Id. at 136.
58. Id. (citing Turner, 482 U.S. at 90-91).
59. Id. (citing Turner, 482 U.S. at 90-91).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 136-37.
62. Id. at 137 (citing Sandlin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 485 (1995)).
63. Id. (citing Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981); Estelle v. Gamble,




A. The Court Erred in Applying the First Turner Factor Since a
"Valid, Rational Connection " Between the Prison Regulation and
the Legitimate Governmental Interests Put Forward to Justify It Do
Not Exist
The Supreme Court erred in its application of the Turner factors
to the MDOC regulations at issue in Overton. With regard to the
restriction on child visitation, the threshold factor was not met; the
regulation bore no "valid, rational connection" to the governmental
interest "in maintaining internal security and protecting child visitors
from exposure to sexual or other misconduct or from accidental
injury" 64 since visits are essential to rehabilitation and non-contact
visits do not expose a visiting child to prisoner misconduct.
Furthermore, with regard to the restriction of visitation rights for
prisoners with two substance abuse violations, the first Turner factor
was not met; the regulation bore no "valid, rational connection" to
the governmental interest in preventing the smuggling of contraband
since the regulation was actually in opposition to this goal.
Both of the regulations at issue dealt exclusively with non-
contact visits.65 The Court reached its conclusion without explaining
how non-contact visits could expose a child to prisoner misconduct.
In fact, it is hard to imagine a situation where inmates could
exchange contraband or a child could be molested during a visit
where the visitor is physically separated from the inmate by a glass
wall.66 Specifically, the Federal Bureau of Prisons reported that
"[clontact visits are a [m]ain [c]onduit for [d]rug [s]muggling. " 67 Infact, the Federal Bureau of Prisons recommended in its report that in
64. Id. at 133.
65. Id. at 130; see also supra text accompanying note 40.
66. Brief of Amici Curiae Public Defender Service for the District of
Columbia et al. at 18, Overton v. Bazzetta, 529 U.S. 126 (2003) (No. 02-94)
[hereinafter Public Defenders' Service Brief].
67. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT No. 1-2003-002, THE FEDERAL
BUREAU OF PRISONS' DRUG INTERDICTION ACTIVITIES, (2003) (emphasis
added), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/inspection/BOP/03-02/
report.pdf.
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order to solve the smuggling of drugs, "contact visits should be
replaced by non-contact visits, ' 68 meaning that even the federal
government believes prohibiting non-contact visits does not bear a
rational connection to the legitimate interest of drug smuggling.
The Court also failed to take into account the fact that "no
evidence was presented to establish that minor children were either
involved in or able to see any [sexual] activity" 69 and that the MDOC
conceded there had been no incidents of sexual abuse or misconduct
occurring during a non-contact visit involving minors since January
1, 1984.70
In fact, what prompted "a wholesale review of [the MDOC's]
visitation policies" was the sexual assault of a 3-year old in 1994. 1
However, "internal reports suggested that the assault could have been
prevented if the department had followed appropriate procedures at
the time... ,72 In fact, the molestation took place in a prison that
had no facilities for non-contact visits. 73 Furthermore, the prison was
aware of the inmate's penchant for molesting young girls and
actually permitted the incident to occur.74 It appears that instead of
choosing to correct procedural problems caused by the MDOC's own
mismanagement, the MDOC chose to punish its prisoners by
restricting their visitation rights.
Furthermore, the visitation ban placed on prisoners with two
substance abuse violations is not related to a penological interest
.since it actually counters the purpose of the restriction. The Court
found the purpose of the ban was to "deter[] the use of drugs and
alcohol within the prisons. 75  However, at trial, an expert's
uncontroverted testimony showed elimination of visitation rights was
"counter therapeutic" and actually caused the prisoner to resort to
68. Id.
69. Bazzetta v. McGinnis, 148 F. Supp. 2d 813, 829 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
70. Id.
71. Shepardson, supra note 2.
72. Id.
73. Man Molests Child During Prison Visit, HAMILTON SPECTATOR, May
19, 1994, at A9.
74. See id. Michigan police Detective Sergeant Tom Ackley stated, "This
should have never happened .... You think somebody by now would at least
make a decision to prohibit this man's visits." Inmate Molests Girl in Prison's
Visiting Room, CHI. TRIB., May 19, 1994, at 3.
75. Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 134 (2003).
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substance abuse.76  In other words, prohibiting visitation for
substance abuse violators would only promote the use of drugs and
alcohol within the prison.
Finally, the Court's belief that restrictions on visitation rights
were rationally connected to the governmental interest of
maintaining internal security is unfounded, especially in light of
evidence that "a well-run visiting program increases the security of
penal institutions. ' 7 Prisons with such programs experience a
reduction in tensions within the prison.78 Also, visitation has a
positive impact on an inmate's ability to adjust to life in prison.79 In
fact, studies show that improved behavior in prison is directly related
to visitation.80 The United States Supreme Court therefore failed to
recognize the positive impact visitation rights have on maintaining a
well-run facility and how visitation can be beneficial to both prison
guards and inmates.
B. The Court Erred in Applying the Second Turner Factor Because
Alternative Means of Communication Did Not Remain Open to
Inmates
When the Court determined the reasonableness of
the regulations by applying the second factor of the Turner
test-whether "alternative means" of exercising the asserted right
existed-the Court held that such alternative means remained open
to the prisoners since they could exercise their right to association
81via telephone calls and letter-writing. The Court found these
alternatives were sufficient for all inmates to exercise their right of
association even where visitation was completely prohibited.
82
Although the Court acknowledged that telephone calls and letter-
writing were not sufficient alternatives for most inmates, the Court
further stated that "[a]lternatives to visitation need not be ideal,
76. Bazzetta v. McGinnis, 148 F. Supp. 2d 813, 854 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
77. MICHAEL B. MUSHLIN, RIGHTS OF PRISONERS § 12:1 (3d ed. 2002)
(citing Kozlowski v. Coughlin, 871 F.2d 241, 242-43 (2d Cir. 1989)).
78. Id. (citing Kozlowski, 871 F.2d at 242-43).
79. MODEL SENTENCING AND CORR. ACT § 4-115 cmt., 10 U.L.A. 470
(2001).
80. Schuelke, supra note 7, at 160.
81. Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 135 (2003).
82. Id.
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however; they need only be available" 83 and that these alternatives
were sufficient to support the restrictions.
84
By stating this, the Court appears to completely do away with
the second factor of the Turner test. The whole point of considering
alternatives is to show that prisoners have open to them other means
of asserting their rights; if not, then the Turner balancing test weighs
in favor of finding the regulation unreasonable. If, however, these
means are available, but impractical, the second prong of the test is
rendered useless.
In Overton, the alternatives of telephone calls and letter-writing
were impractical. "At trial, unchallenged expert testimony showed
that 40 to 80% of inmates are functionally illiterate, unable to
compose a letter., 85 Furthermore, visitation is the only way for
prisoners to communicate with younger children who have not yet
learned to speak or read.86 Most prisoners, therefore, would not be
able to exercise their right to association under the MDOC
regulations.
Also, the telephone call alternative is impractical because not
only are the calls "brief and expensive," 87 but they are constantly
disrupted with a "message com[ing] over the telephone every few
minutes announcing that the call is being monitored.,
88
Furthermore, both letter-writing and telephone calls strip the inmate
and the visitor of the ability to see each other. If rehabilitation is
facilitated by the prisoners' contact with the outside world, the
alternative means of asserting the right to association must be
effective if the prisoner is to reap any benefits from its use.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Bazzetta v. McGinnis, 286 F.3d 311, 319 (6th Cir. 2002).
86. MUSHLIN, supra note 77, § 12:2.
87. Overton, 539 U.S. at 135.
88. Brief of Amici Curiae American Civil Liberties Union et al. at 16 n.5,
Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126 (Feb. 18, 2003) (No. 02-94).
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C. The Court Erred in Applying the Third Turner Factor Because
Accomodating the Right Would Not Have a Significant Impact on
Guards, Prisoners, or the Reallocation of the Prison's Financial
Resources
The third Turner factor considers the impact of accommodating
the asserted right on guards, other inmates, and the allocation of
prison resources. 89  The United States Supreme Court's cursory
explanation as to how the regulations in Overton met this factor
consisted of the statement, "Accommodating [the] respondents'
demands would cause a significant reallocation of the prison
system's financial resources and would impair the ability of
corrections officers to protect all who are inside a prison's walls."
90
This statement, however, is unsubstantiated, tenuous at best, and, at
worst, completely disregards the profound impact on the prisoners'
quality of life.
As stated earlier, expanding prisoner visitation rights has a
positive rather than a negative impact on guards and inmates alike.9'
Furthermore, the MDOC regulations were enacted in response to
prison overcrowding and to relieve the strain on the MDOC's
resources. 92 In 1999, however, the MDoC reported that its prison
population only increased by 1.5%, 2.9% lower than projected.
93
The MDOC credited this reduction in growth to the decrease in the
number of parole violators with new sentences and a decrease in the
number of parole violators returning to prison.94 Prisoner visitation
may therefore be instrumental to the success of the prisoner on
parole, and may lead to a reduction in recidivism rates. Decades of
studies support the assertion that prisoner visitation encourages
"rehabilitation, reduce[s] behavior problems, and significantly
increase[s] a prisoner's chance for success on parole."95  The
MDOC's regulations ignore this body of evidence and set the system
up for a vicious cycle of recidivism and overcrowding.
89. Tumer v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 90 (1987).
90. Overton, 539 U.S. at 135.
91. See supra Part IV.A.
92. Overton, 539 U.S. at 129.
93. MICH. DEP'T. OF CORR., 1999 ANNUAL REPORT 41 (1999), available at
http://www.michigan.gov/documents/1999annual 2148_7.pdf.
94. Id. at 42.
95. MUSHLIN, supra note 77, § 12:1 (quoting Bazetta v. McGinnis, 286
F.3d 311 (6th Cir. 2002)).
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If visitation leads to successful parolees and reduced recidivism
rates, which in turn lead to a decrease in the overall prison
population, prison resources will become less strained as result of
visitation. Restricting visitation rights may cause the reverse,
resulting in an even greater strain on prison resources. Therefore, the
MDOC regulations may actually be perpetuating the need for the
prison to reallocate a significant amount of its financial resources in
response to the growth in the prison population. The Court's focus
on the facial rationales for the regulations fails to recognize
the underlying principles it seeks to prevent and protect.
Accommodating the Respondents' demands in Overton would not
cause a significant reallocation of the MDOC's financial resources
because in the end, expanded prisoner visitation rights may lead to a
decrease in the prison population, freeing-up financial resources
rather than straining them.
D. The Court Erred in Applying the Fourth Turner Factor Because
the Inmates Suggested Alternatives that Would Have No More than a
De Minimis Cost to the MDOC's Penological Interests
The final factor in assessing the reasonableness of prison
regulations is "the absence of ready alternatives. 96 The Overton
Court recognized that the existence of such ready alternatives may be
an indication that the regulations are an "'exaggerated response' to
prison concerns. 97 The Court further pronounced, "Turner does not
impose a least-restrictive-alternative test," but instead requires the
prisoner to suggest an obvious alternative that completely
accommodates the inmate's right, and that does not impose more
than a "de minimis cost" upon the legitimate governmental interest.
98
The Court concluded that the Respondents failed to make such a
showing in this case.
99
The Court erred in its judgment for the following reasons: first,
the Respondents suggested that "allowing visitation by nieces and
nephews or children for whom parental rights have been terminated
96. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-90 (1987).
97. Id. at 90.





[was] an obvious alternative."100 Such an alternative would not, as
the Court determined, result in more than a de minimis cost to the
MDOC's penological goals. In fact, the goal of reducing the number
of visitors could still easily be met if the MDOC allowed these
children to visit prisoners.
To illustrate, the Sixth Circuit duly noted that the MDOC hoped
the regulations would decrease visits by 10-15%, "at which point
they apparently believed visits would again be manageable."'
0'1
Once the regulations were enacted, however, the MDOC's figures
showed that visits fell by 50%.102 In other words, these regulations
were not expected to cause the drastic drop in visits that actually
occurred. "In light of these facts, the regulations appear as attempts
not to manage visits but to end them."'1 3 The goal of the regulations
was to reduce the number of visitors, not to completely cut-off
prisoners from all visitors.
In fact, taking the above statistics into account, the regulation
seems to be an "exaggerated response" to these penological goals. In
fact, the alternative the Respondents suggested better fits these goals
than the regulation the MDOC actually enacted, since the enacted
regulation decreased visits far beyond what the MDOC expected.
Permitting nieces, nephews, and children whose parental rights have
been terminated to visit inmates would more closely meet the
expected decrease in visitors of 10-15%; therefore, this alternative
would not impose more than a de minimis cost upon the valid
penological goal of maintaining internal security and protecting
children from misconduct. It would more closely meet the MDOC's
expected decrease.
The Respondents also suggested the permanent ban on visits for
prisoners with two or more substance abuse violations could be
reduced or the permanent ban could be imposed only for the most
serious violations. 0 4 The Court rejected these alternatives, stating
they did not accommodate the right to association at a de minimis
100. Id.
101. Bazzetta v. McGinnis, 286 F.3d 311, 318 (6th Cir. 2002).
102. Id. (citing Bazzetta v. McGinnis, 148 F. Supp. 2d 813, 820-21 (E.D.
Mich. 2001)).
103. Id.
104. Overton, 539 U.S. at 136.
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cost to the penological goals of the prison.'0 5 The Court found the
substance abuse regulation supposedly furthered the penological goal
of "deterring the use of drugs and alcohol within the prisons."'
10 6
However, the Respondents' suggested alternative more closely
relates to that penological goal than the actual regulation, especially
since the regulation was used to punish prisoners rather than to
prevent the use of drugs.
As the Sixth Circuit acknowledged, the MDOC "has imposed
visitation bans capriciously and according to no reviewable
standards." 10 7 In fact, the permanent ban was placed on "only 41%
of prisoners with two violations"'1 8 between 1995 and 2000, yet was
sometimes placed on inmates "for what [was] effectively a single
drug infraction."' 0 9 Far from being used for the purpose of
preventing drug smuggling, the MDOC has instead used the
substance abuse restriction as an arbitrary punishment.
Even more troubling is the fact that the substance abuse
regulation is a "permanent ban [on visitation] that may be removed
after two years." 110 Even the Court recognized that "the restriction is
severe. And if faced with evidence that MDOC's regulation is treated
as a de facto permanent ban on all visitation for certain inmates, we
might reach a different conclusion... ."111 The regulation, however,
clearly contemplates a permanent ban on visitation for those inmates
with two substance abuse violations.1 2  The Respondents'
alternative of shortening the period of the restriction or applying the
restriction only for the most serious violations would reduce the
105. Id.
106. Id. at 134.
107. Bazzetta v. McGinnis, 286 F.3d 311, 321 (6th Cir. 2002).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 322.
One inmate received a permanent ban after being found in possession
of marijuana (violation #1) and then testing positive for the drug 75
minutes later (violation #2); another received a permanent ban after
throwing a packet of marijuana on the ground (violation #1) then
being found with another on his person during the ensuing search
(violation #2).
Id. (citing Bazzetta v. McGinnis, 148 F. Supp. 2d. 813, 838 n.39 (E.D. Mich.
2001)).
110. Id. (emphasis added).
111. Overton, 539 U.S. at 134.
112. See id. at 130.
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arbitrary and capricious manner in which the regulation had been
carried out. "One need hardly be cynical about prison administrators
to recognize that the distinct possibility of retaliatory or otherwise
groundless deprivations of visits calls for a modicum of procedural
protections to guard against such behavior." 1 3 It would also better
serve the penological goal of reducing drug use if the restriction was
not a permanent ban that could only be removed at the discretion of
the prison official,l" 4 but a two year ban that could be reinstated if
another substance abuse violation occurred. Such an alternative
would not impose more than a de minimis cost upon the valid
penological goal of preventing drug use.
V. IMPLICATIONS
The Turner test and its application to prison regulations should
be revised to fully take into account all of the penological goals of
prisons. The Overton holding recognizes a valid interest in
maintaining the internal security of prisons, but it is carried out at the
expense of the goal of rehabilitation. A more accurate test would be
to balance the legitimate prison interests rather than allowing the
prison to point to just one interest.
The Overton holding directly cuts against the penological
interest of rehabilitation, which was specifically identified as such by
the United States Supreme Court in Procunier v. Martinez. 15 In
fact, in 2002, the United States Supreme Court recognized that
"[s]ince 'most offenders will eventually return to society, [a]
paramount objective of the corrections system is the rehabilitation of
those committed to its custody.'16
However, Justice Thomas' concurrence in Overton appears to
discount the Court's prior holdings. He outlines a brief history of
prisons and goes so far as to state that prisoner visitation rights were
used to punish, rather than benefit, the inmate. 117  This view,
however, is not widely accepted, especially with regard to visitation
113. Ky. Dep't of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 470 (1989) (Marshall,
J., dissenting).
114. Bazzetta, 286 F.3d at 322.
115. 416 U.S. 396, 404,412 (1973).
116. McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 36 (2002) (quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417
U.S. 817, 823 (1974)).
117. Overton, 539 U.S. at 144 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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by children.1 18 Justice Thomas' rendition of the history of prisons
suggests that America has a tradition of restricting prisoners'
visitation rights, but the facts point to the contrary. For example, as
early as 1849, the state of Pennsylvania "urged that prisoners be
allowed to receive letters and visits from relatives, in order to reduce
the deleterious effects of solitary confinement." 119 In other words,
Thomas appears to go through a revisionist history regarding the
importance of visitation rights and their beneficial effects on
prisoners.
The Court should continue to recognize rehabilitation as a
legitimate penological interest that cannot be overruled simply
because another interest exists. Visitation rights are necessary to the
prisoner because "[n]o single factor has been proven to be more
directly correlated with the objective of a crime-free return to society
than visiting." 120 In fact, rules restricting prisoner visitation rights do
not contribute to an inmate's progress. 121 "Indeed, they may be
counterproductive, causing prisoners to feel hostile, bitter, and
estranged from their families.' ' 122  By restricting a prisoner's
visitation rights, especially by completely barring an inmate from
even non-contact visits, the United States Supreme Court has
undermined the very penological interest it set out to protect when it
established the Turner test.
Rehabilitation becomes especially important in light of the
number of prisoners released on parole. For example, in 2001,
"[a]bout 600,000 individuals-roughly 1,600 a day-[were] released
from state and federal prisons ... to return to their communities."'
123
The increase in the prison population has a direct relation to the
118. See JAMES J. GOBERT & NEIL P. COHEN, RIGHTS OF PRISONERS 130
(1981).
119. Public Defenders Service Brief, supra note 66, at 16-17.
120. MUSHLIN, supra note 77, § 12:1 (citing Kozlowski v. Coughlin, 871
F.2d 241, 242 (2d Cir. 1989) ("[I]t has been empirically established that
[visiting] is a prerequisite to successful parole"); STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, standard 23.6.2, cmt. 23-82 (1986) ("Because almost all inmates
ultimately will be returned to the community at the expiration of their terms, it
is important to preserve, wherever possible, family and community ties.").
121. GOBERT & COHEN, supra note 118, at 132.
122. Id.
123. JEREMY TRAVIS ET AL., THE URBAN INST. JUSTICE POLICY CTR., FROM




number of prisoners paroled: the more people who are incarcerated,
the more who will be ultimately released into the community.124
Prisoner visitation rights facilitate successful parole because
generally, inmates who retain relationships with their family while
incarcerated will be more successful once released than those who
fail to maintain such relationships.125 The importance of
rehabilitation, therefore, should not be discounted simply because the
prison has additional concerns such as internal security, which can be
addressed without hampering rehabilitation efforts.
In fact, "[u]ntil 1995, the [MDOC's] own guidelines said
visitation was an essential part of rehabilitation."' 126 It appears that
the MDOC's guidelines were changed because it did not want to deal
with the extra visitors resulting from the prison overcrowding that
had prompted the enactment of the regulations in the first place. The
Court should not allow a prison to deprive its inmates of their rights
because the prison identifies only one penological goal at the
expense of other legitimate interests. Such a holding allows prisons
to be reticent and take the "easy way out" when they do not want to
make the extra effort to accommodate a prisoner's rights. The
Turner test should be amended so that all penological goals,
including rehabilitation, are taken into account and balanced to
ensure that prison officials do not shirk their responsibility in
furthering one of the most important goals of prisons: rehabilitation.
VI. CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court has followed a trend of
limiting prisoners' rights, and its ruling in Overton is no exception.
The problem, however, is that in limiting prisoners' rights, the Court
undermines the very principles the MDOC set out to protect, namely,
reducing recidivism, protecting children, and decreasing the prison
population. The only way these goals can remain intact is through
the rehabilitation of the prisoner.
Studies show that "[p]risoners who maintain continuous, quality
contact with three people while they are incarcerated.., are only
one-sixth as likely as others to be back in prison a year after their
124. Id. at 4.
125. Id. at 39.
126. Shepardson, supra note 2.
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release."'127 For a child, visiting a parent or relative in prison may be
a difficult experience, but not seeing them at all may be worse. "The
child is effectively cut off from personal contact with the parent,
producing a situation unlikely to foster strong parent-child ties.'
' 28
This reasoning is also true for those prisoners who act as parents to
children outside of the strictly biological parenting paradigm. This is
especially true in light of the 1999 National Survey of America's
Families finding that 2.3 million children lived with non-parent
relatives in 1999.129
In the wake of the Sixth Circuit's ruling in Bazzetta v.
McGinnis, the MDOC revised its visitation rules so that minor
siblings could visit inmates, minor nieces and nephews could have
non-contact visits with inmates, and the restrictions regarding drug-
offenders were changed so that inmates who committed one violation
were restricted to non-contact visits.' 30 Following the Supreme
Court's ruling, however, the MDOC will more than likely reinstate
the original regulations.1 3' This would certainly be an unfortunate
end to the Overton battle. The expansion of prisoners' rights and the
theory of rehabilitation should not be forgotten in today's rush to
build more prisons.
Stacy Barker will be eligible for parole in 2008.132 She will
return to her daughter when she is paroled, and that daughter may be
the reason why Barker will never return to prison again. The
stronger Barker's ties to her daughter, the more difficult it will be for
her to commit a crime knowing she will return to prison.
127. Joanne Mariner, Rhenquist Family Values: The Supreme Court's
Misguided Decision in Overton v. Bazzetta, at http://writ.news.findlaw.com
/mariner/20030624.html (June 24, 2003).
128. GOBERT & COHEN, supra note 118, at 132.
129. AMY JANTZ ET AL., THE CONTINUING EVOLUTION OF STATE KINSHIP
CARE POLICIES 1 (2002), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/
310597_state_kinshipcare.pdf.
130. Supreme Court: Michigan Prison Visitation Rules Upheld, FACTS ON
FILE WORLD NEWS DIG., June 16, 2003, at 494G2, LEXIS: News &
Business/News/News.All.
131. See Visitation Restrictions Upheld in Mich., CORRECTIONS TODAY,
Aug. 1, 2003, 2003 WL 14014485.
132. Jennifer Chambers, Plea Bargain Gives Closure to Victim's Grieving
Family, DETROIT NEWS, Dec. 6, 2001, available at http://www.detnews.com/
2001/oakland/OI112/09/d04-360099.htm. Barker will be eligible for parole in
2008 due to a plea bargain that was struck after her murder conviction was
overturned on appeal. Id.
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If one takes time to step back and look carefully at the principles
underlying prison overcrowding and how this problem can be solved
through prison visitation, the results might be startlingly different
from the decision the United States Supreme Court rendered in
Overton v. Bazzetta.
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